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All human Ebola virus outbreaks during 2001–2003 in
the forest zone between Gabon and Republic of Congo
resulted from handling infected wild animal carcasses. After
the first outbreak, we created an Animal Mortality
Monitoring Network in collaboration with the Gabonese and
Congolese Ministries of Forestry and Environment and
wildlife organizations (Wildlife Conservation Society and
Programme de Conservation et Utilisation Rationnelle des
Ecosystèmes Forestiers en Afrique Centrale) to predict and
possibly prevent human Ebola outbreaks. Since August
2001, 98 wild animal carcasses have been recovered by
the network, including 65 great apes. Analysis of 21 car-
casses found that 10 gorillas, 3 chimpanzees, and 1 duiker
tested positive for Ebola virus. Wild animal outbreaks
began before each of the 5 human Ebola outbreaks. Twice
we alerted the health authorities to an imminent risk for
human outbreaks, weeks before they occurred.
E
bola virus, a member of the Filoviridae family, causes
severe hemorrhagic fever in humans and nonhuman
primates. The human case-fatality rate ranged from 50% to
89%, according to the viral subtype, from the first out-
breaks in Zaire and Sudan in 1976 to the 2003 outbreaks in
the Republic of Congo (1–4). No effective therapy or pro-
phylaxis exists, and Ebola is a major public health concern.
The first recorded human Ebola outbreaks (Yambuku Zaire
1976; Nzara, Sudan, 1976 and 1979; Tandala, Zaire, 1977)
occurred abruptly, from an unidentified source, with sub-
sequent person-to-person spread (1,2,5,6). No trace of the
virus was initially found in wild animals close to the out-
breaks (7–9). In 1989, for the first time, a nonhuman pri-
mate outbreak due to a new subtype of Ebola virus, Ebola
subtype Reston, occurred in a colony of Macaca fascicu-
laris in a quarantine facility in Reston, Virginia, USA, after
the introduction of monkeys from the Philippines (10).
Ebola Reston caused severe hemorrhagic fever in mon-
keys, but no clinical cases of human infection were identi-
fied, even though anti-filovirus antibodies were found in
quarantine facility personnel (11). Later, in 1994, Ebola-
specific immunohistochemical staining was positive on
necropsy specimens from 1 of 12 chimpanzees that died in
the Tai forest of Côte d’Ivoire (12). During this outbreak,
an ethnologist was infected while performing an autopsy
on a chimpanzee carcass; this was the first documented
case of human infection transmitted by a nonhuman pri-
mate (13). During the 1996 outbreak in Mayibout (Gabon),
an epidemiologic survey showed that the index case-
patients had been infected by contact with a chimpanzee
carcass. Concurrently, many nonhuman primate carcasses
were reported in the area close to the outbreak, but none
was recovered (14,15). Recently, we showed that all the
human Ebola virus outbreaks that occurred in the past 3
years in Gabon and the Republic of Congo resulted from
multiple introductions of the virus from different infected
animal carcasses (16). We describe the development, test-
ing, and evaluation of an Animal Mortality Monitoring
Network (AMMN) in northeastern Gabon and northwest-
ern Republic of Congo designed to alert human and animal
health authorities on emerging epidemics.
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Epidemiologic Surveillance Network
An alert network was set up by the Ministries of Health
in hospitals and clinics in the different regions of Gabon
and Republic of Congo, designed to report all human cases
of viral hemorrhagic syndromes. Particular attention was
paid to the northeastern region of Gabon, which had
already been affected by outbreaks, and to its border region
with Republic of Congo. Wildlife organizations such as the
Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS), Programme de
Conservation et Utilisation Rationnelle des Ecosystèmes
Forestiers en Afrique Centrale (ECOFAC), and the World
Wildlife Fund (WWF) were chosen to form the backbone
of AMMN, in close collaboration with the Ministries of
Forestry and Environment of the 2 countries. WWF was
present in the Minkébé Reserve in Gabon, while ECOFAC
was in charge of the Odzala National Park and the Lossi
gorilla sanctuary in Republic of Congo (Figure 1).
All information on human cases of viral hemorrhagic
syndrome or on the presence of dead animals in affected
areas was centralized by a Viral Hemorrhagic Fever
Committee (VHFC), composed of representatives of the
Ministries of Health, Forestry, and Environment, the World
Health Organization (WHO), wildlife agencies, and the
Centre International de Recherches Médicales de
Franceville (CIRMF). VHFC was also charged with send-
ing specialized CIRMF teams to sample animal carcasses
for diagnostic purposes. CIRMF is the regional reference
laboratory for viral hemorrhagic fevers, and communicates
its results to the ministries of health, forestry, and environ-
ment and to WHO.
Ebola Outbreak Investigation: Human Case Data
The Gabonese and Congolese Ministries of Health, in
close collaboration with WHO and its partners in the
Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GOARN),
were in charge of human epidemiologic investigations. A
case of Ebola hemorrhagic fever was defined as any prob-
able or laboratory-confirmed case, based on international-
ly recognized criteria (definition available from
http://www.who.int/emc/diseases/ebola/ebola7.html).
Ebola Outbreak Investigation: Animal Data
Collection Sites 
From August 2001 to June 2003, carcasses were found
on both sides of the Gabon–Republic of Congo border in
the Ogooué Ivindo (Gabon) and West Basin (Congo)
provinces (Figure 1). This entire area is covered by a
Marantaceae  and  Zingiberaceae  forest, with both open
and closed canopies. The climate is equatorial, with 2 dry
seasons (December–February and June–August) and 2 wet
seasons (March–May and September–November). Mean
rainfall is 1,500 mm per year and mean temperature is
24°C. Relative humidity always exceeds 80% (village of
Mboko, Republic of Congo, 1995) (17).
Fauna 
The large-animal fauna includes Loxodonta africana
(Elephant),  Syncerus caffer (Buffalo),  Tragelaphus  sp.
(Sitatunga), Cephalophus sp. (Duiker), Hylochoerus mein-
ertzhagim  (Giant Forest Hog), Potamochoerus porcus
(Red River Hog), Gorilla gorilla, Pan troglodytes
(Chimpanzee), Cercopithecus sp. (Guenon),  Cercocebus
sp. (Mangabey), Colobus sp., Panthera pardus (Leopard),
Nandinia  (Two-spotted Palm Civet), Civettidis civetta
(African Civet), Genetta servalina (Genet), mongoose sp.,
Orycteropus afer (Antbear),  Manis  sp. (Pangolin),
Atherurus africanus,  Thryonomys swinderianus, and
Python sebae (17,18).
Carcass Detection 
Local hunters (primarily adult and adolescent men of
the Bakota, Bakola, Mboko, Mongom, and Pygmy tribes)
were the main sources of information regarding the loca-
tion of carcasses. Their reported sightings were confirmed
by ECOFAC monitoring teams who recorded both the
global positioning system (GPS) position on a Cyber
Traker field computer (available from http://www.cyber-
tracker.co.za/) and carcass status before alerting VHFC.
Sampling Team and Methods 
When wild animal carcasses were found, VHFC asked
CIRMF to send a team to the site for diagnostic purposes.
Sampling permits were granted by the Gabonese and
Congolese Ministries of Forestry and Environment and
Health. Owing to the isolated nature of the outbreak zone
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Figure 1. Map of the forest zone straddling the border between
Gabon and Republic of Congo, showing (red points) the location
of Ebola virus–positive carcasses, confirmed by testing in the
Centre International de Recherches Médicales de Franceville
biosafety level 4 unit during the 2001–2003 outbreaks in Gabon
and Republic of Congo.and its distance from CIRMF, a base camp was established
nearby. GPS location of the carcasses, and the information
provided on their state of decomposition, allowed the
autopsy team to sample only the freshest carcasses. 
Wild animal Carcass Sampling
Ideally, the carcass sampling teams comprised a mini-
mum of 5 persons (3 porters and 2 persons to perform the
autopsy). One of the porters was charged with disinfection
procedures. Digital photographs were taken. Necropsy was
performed with high-level precautions, including water-
tight clothes (Pro-Tech “C,” Tyvek, Contern, Luxembourg)
equipped with air filtration equipment and Proflow
Automask Litehood face shields (Delta Protection, Lyon,
France) (Figure 2), and disposable lancets and forceps. A
2% chlorine spray was used to disinfect reusable equip-
ment (masks and filtration apparatus), as well as the autop-
sy site and carcass remnants. Hermetic 60-L containers
equipped with safety tops were used to transport reusable
equipment and waste. Waste was returned to the main
camp for incineration.
The nature of the samples taken depended on the state
of the carcasses. When the carcasses were in good condi-
tion, 0.5-cm3 specimens of liver, spleen, muscle, and skin
were taken. Half of the samples were placed in Nunc
CryoTube vials (Nalge International, Rochester, New
York, USA), which were placed in a small liquid nitrogen
dry-shipper container (5.4 L) for cryopreservation
(–196°C). The other samples were placed in Nunc
CryoTube vials containing 10% formalin, for immunohis-
tochemical testing. Bones were placed in hermetic con-
tainers. At the main camp, the dry-shipper contents were
transferred into larger dry-shipper containers (20.3 L),
which were then forwarded to the CIRMF laboratory at the
end of the mission.
Laboratory Studies
Sample Preparation 
Potentially infected specimens were collected and
manipulated according to WHO guidelines on viral hemor-
rhagic fever agents in Africa (19). Muscle and skin tissue
were fragmented and homogenized in phosphate- buffered
saline, and the final supernatant was filtered for antigen
detection and RNA amplification. Bones were cut, and
internal tissue was scraped. Bone marrow or internal bone
tissue was prepared in the same way as muscle and skin.
Testing 
Muscle and skin tissue samples were tested by poly-
merase chain reaction (PCR), antigen detection, and, in
some cases, immunohistochemical staining. Bone marrow
and internal bone tissue were tested by PCR only.
Antigen Detection 
Samples were used for antigen detection as previously
described (20). Briefly, Maxisorp (Nalge International)
plates were coated with a cocktail of 7 monoclonal anti-
bodies against Ebola virus Zaire antigens; control plates
were coated with normal mouse ascitic fluid produced
from a parent myeloma cell line. Sample extracts (see
above) were then added to the wells, followed by hyper-
immune rabbit Ebola polyvalent antiserum and then per-
oxidase-conjugated goat antibodies against rabbit
immunoglobulin G (IgG). The TMB detector system
(Dynex Technologies, Issy-les Molineaux, France) was
used to measure optical density.
DNA Amplification 
For the detection of viral mRNA, total RNAwas isolat-
ed from sample extracts by using the RNeasy kit (Qiagen,
Hilden, Germany), and cDNA was synthesized from
mRNA as previously described (21). Two pairs of degen-
erate primers corresponding to the L-gene of Ebola virus
were used for 2 rounds of amplification, yielding a 298-bp
fragment (5′-TATMGRAATTTTTCYTTYTCATT -3′ and
5′-ATGTGGTGGGYTATAAWARTCACTRACAT-3′ for
primary PCR; 5′-GCWAAAGCMTTYCCWAGYAAYAT-
GATGG-3′ and 5′-ATAAWARTCACTR ACATGCA-
TATAACA-3′ for nested PCR).
Immunohistochemical Staining 
Formalin-fixed specimens were sent to the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (Atlanta, Georgia, USA)
for immunohistochemical staining as previously described
(22).
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Figure 2. Field watertight clothes equipped with air filtration equip-
ment, used for high-risk wild animal necropsy. Odzala National
Park, Republic of Congo, June 2003. Photo: P. Rouquet.Results
Human Outbreaks
From October 2001 to December 2003, 5 human Ebola
virus outbreaks of the Zaire subtype occurred in the area
straddling the border between Gabon (northeast) and
Republic of Congo (northwest), with 313 cases and 264
deaths (23,24). The first outbreak occurred from October
2001 to May 2002, with a total of 92 cases and 70 deaths
in Gabon and Republic of Congo. Epidemiologic investi-
gations showed that at least 2 duikers, 2 chimpanzees, and
2 gorilla carcasses were involved or suspected of being
involved in the infection of 6 human index patients. Asec-
ond human outbreak began in January 2002 and ended in
June 2002 in Entsiami Republic of Congo, with a total of
30 cases and 25 deaths. One gorilla and 1 duiker were sus-
pected of involvement in 2 human index cases. Athird out-
break occurred from May to June 2002 in Oloba Republic
of Congo, with 13 cases and 12 deaths. A chimpanzee was
shown to have infected the human index patient. The
fourth outbreak occurred from December 2002 to April
2003 in Mbomo and Kelle, Republic of Congo, with 143
cases and 128 deaths. Gorillas and duikers were suspected
of infecting 3 human index patients. The last outbreak
occurred from November 2003 to December 2003 in
Mbanza and Mbomo, Republic of Congo, with 35 cases
and 29 deaths. The source of infection of the human index
patient was not clearly identified.
Carcasses
From August 2001 to June 2003, a total of 98 animal
carcasses were found in an area of about 20,000 km2
(Figure 3). Carcasses of 3 principal species were recov-
ered: 65 great apes (50 gorillas and 15 chimpanzees) and
14 duikers (Figure 3). Only 6% of carcasses sampled were
in good condition (entire body); 57% were in poor condi-
tion (partial carcasses with muscles or skin); and 38% were
in bad condition (bones only). Two peaks of animal deaths
were observed (Figure 4). The first occurred in the Ekata
region (Gabon) from November to December 2001, with
51 carcasses, including 30 great apes and 8 duikers. The
second occurred from December 2002 to February 2003 in
the Lossi gorilla sanctuary (Republic of Congo), with 20
carcasses, including 17 great apes, 2 duikers, and 1
Cercopithecus cephus. 
Laboratory Findings
An animal carcass was considered infected by Ebola
virus if >1 of the 3 laboratory tests (antigen detection,
DNA amplification, and immunohistochemical staining)
was positive. When possible, DNAamplification was con-
firmed by sequencing the PCR products. Twenty-one
gorilla, chimpanzee, and duiker carcasses were sampled in
the wild and analyzed in the CIRMF biosafety level 4
(BSL-4) laboratory. Fourteen of these carcasses tested pos-
itive for Ebola virus, 6 in 2 or 3 tests and 8 in only 1 test
(Table). Eight positive samples were muscles, and 6 were
bones or bone marrow. All the muscle and skin tissue sam-
ples were tested by both PCR and antigen detection. In
total, 10 gorillas, 3 chimpanzees, and 1 duiker tested posi-
tive. All the relatively well-preserved gorilla and chim-
panzee carcasses tested positive. In contrast,
well-preserved samples taken from carcasses of C. cephus,
Genetta sp., and Tragelaphus sp. were negative. 
Discussion
We describe the successful implementation of a sur-
veillance network of Ebola outbreaks in wild large
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Figure 3. Species distribution of carcasses found in the forest
straddling the border between Gabon and Republic of Congo
(2001–2003). * = other primates: Cercopithecus  sp.; † = other
species:  Atherurus africanus (1),  Genetta sp (3), Loxodonta
africana (1), Manis sp. (1), Mongoose sp. (1), Thryonomys swinde-
rianus (2), Tragelaphus sp. (1), Python sebae (2), and bird of prey
(1).
Figure 4. Temporal distribution of carcasses found in the forest
straddling the border between Gabon and the Republic of Congo
(2001–2003). Two peaks of mortality were observed: the first
occurred in the Ekata region (Gabon) from November to
December 2001 and the second from December 2002 to February
2003 in the Lossi gorilla sanctuary (Republic of Congo).mammals. We often identified wild animal outbreaks
before human Ebola outbreaks. Twice this enabled us to
alert the health authorities of Republic of Congo and
Gabon to an imminent risk for human outbreaks, after the
discovery of carcasses of Ebola virus–infected animals.
Human Ebola outbreaks in this region have always
occurred in remote areas, raising major logistic problems.
Roads are often barely passable, and means of communica-
tion are frequently nonexistent. The carcass detection and
investigation network therefore had to rely on teams
already present in these forest zones, and notably those pos-
sessing radios or satellite telephones. Conservation organi-
zations such as ECOFAC, WCS, and WWF were thus the
ideal partners. ECOFAC monitoring teams played a critical
role by exploring remote forest zones, capitalizing on the
information provided by villagers and hunters. 
Performing an autopsy on high-risk animal carcasses
requires heavy equipment, highly qualified personnel, and
experienced veterinarians, as illustrated by the case of the
Swiss anthropologist who was infected after examining a
chimpanzee carcass without adequate protective measures
in the Tai forest (13). Carcasses decompose very rapidly in
the equatorial forest: an adult male gorilla carcass (≈150
kg) takes only 10 days to decompose entirely, i.e., be
reduced to a heap of bones and hair (Figure 5). Carcasses
observed 3–4 days after death bear few signs of scavenger
activity but are covered with fly eggs and maggots.
Maggots consume the entire flesh within 5 to 10 days,
while scavengers (mainly mongoose) take pieces and dis-
seminate them around the site. Thus, after ≈3weeks, only a
few bones bearing small-mammal gnaw marks remain.
Although the PCR technique used by CIRMF can
detect Ebola virus genetic material in carcasses 3–4 weeks
old, the material is often degraded and incomplete. Often,
only a small sequence of the L-gene (RNA polymerase)
can be analyzed, and this cannot be used for strain identi-
fication. Furthermore, degraded samples increase the
false-negative rate (25). Rapid sampling is therefore cru-
cial for successful diagnosis, and the availability of a small
aeroplane was particularly helpful in certain cases. The
presence of the CIRMF BSL4 laboratory relatively close to
the outbreak area was a considerable advantage.
Using a combination of 3 laboratory techniques (PCR,
immunohistochemical staining, and antigen capture), we
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panzees can be decimated by Ebola. Bones of a
Cephalophus dorsalis carcass also tested positive for
Ebola virus by reverse transcription (RT)-PCR, indicating
that a third wild species may be naturally susceptible. In
Africa, only chimpanzees had previously been diagnosed
as positive for Ebola virus, by immunohistochemical test-
ing, in the Tai forest of Côte d’Ivoire, and were considered
the cause of the human outbreak in Mayibout (Gabon)
(12,14,15). The large number of carcasses found in this
region, together with the results of animal population cen-
suses conducted in the Lossi reserve before and after out-
breaks, indicates that great apes are affected massively and
duikers to a lesser extent (16,26). The lowland gorilla pop-
ulation density in this region (<6 times as high as the chim-
panzee population density) is among the highest in the
world (<10 gorillas/km2) (27), which likely explains why
more gorilla carcasses than chimpanzee carcasses were
found. High population density can amplify outbreaks but
cannot alone explain their severity. Small monkeys,
although abundant in this area, do not seem to be affected.
Only 1 carcass of Cercopithecus cephus was found; it was
in good condition but was negative by RT-PCR and anti-
gen capture (Table). Some Potamochoerus porcus carcass-
es were reported by hunters but none could be sampled.
Carcasses of large animals are more likely to be found than
those of small animals, because the time taken for a car-
cass to decompose depends on its size. 
The source of gorilla infection is unknown, but sever-
al lines of evidence point to direct infection by >1 natural
hosts. First, the detection of different strains of Ebola
virus in gorilla carcasses located only a few kilometers
apart argues against a major role of gorilla-to-gorilla
transmission. Indeed, Ebola virus remains genetically sta-
ble during a given outbreak, from the first to the last case
(28,29), whereas we obtained 4 different glycoprotein
sequences (E.M. Leroy, P. Rouquet, unpub. data) from
samples of gorillas and chimps located in the Lossi sanc-
tuary. The large distance separating positive carcasses
found during a short period, and the existence of physical
barriers such as roads and rivers, also supports direct
transmission from a natural host. Finally, the occurrence
of simultaneous outbreaks in 2 or 3 different species that
display little interspecies contact (30) provides further
evidence that gorillas and chimpanzees are directly infect-
ed by >1 natural hosts. However, cases of gorilla-to-goril-
la transmission cannot be ruled out, especially within a
given group. Indeed, 5 gorilla carcasses belonging to the
same group were found in a close area in the Lossi sanc-
tuary. Ebola outbreaks in gorilla groups may result in their
rapid dissolution, especially if the dominant male is rap-
idly affected, which forces possibly infected females to
integrate into another group. However, this type of inter-
group transmission appears to be marginal.
Chimpanzees are probably infected by the same mech-
anisms as gorillas. During the Tai outbreak in Côte
d’Ivoire, carnivorous behavior (especially consumption of
Colobus monkeys) was the suspected source of infection
(12), but this notion is challenged by the infection of goril-
las, which are almost exclusively herbivorous. However,
chimpanzees are considered to be the primate species
whose behavior (mainly fighting, social grooming, sexual
activities, and predation) carry the highest risk for both
intra- and interspecies pathogen transmission (30). This
idea is supported by the detection of the infected carcasses
of a mother and her 1-year-old offspring. Repeated contact
between young individuals and their mothers is known to
be a significant risk factor for Ebola virus transmission
(2,6).
Duikers represent a special case. Although they are the
most common large-mammal species in this region, few
carcasses were found. This circumstance may be due to the
lack of interactions among individuals, as duikers general-
ly live alone or in pairs. Some duikers, despite being
herbivorous, eat the flesh of decomposing carcasses
(K. Abernethy, unpub. data). Thus, in addition to being
directly infected by the natural host(s), duikers might also
become infected by licking or eating fresh carcasses of
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Figure 5. State of the wild animal carcasses found in the field, Lossi gorilla sanctuary, Republic of Congo, December 2002. Carcasses
decompose very rapidly in the equatorial forest. Photo: P. Rouquet. A) Female chimpanzee, 3 days after death. B) Female gorilla, 7 days
after death. C) Female gorilla, 21 days after death.Ebola virus–infected animals. This scenario would play a
marginal role, however, because carcasses are only infec-
tive for 3 or 4 days after the animal’s death (E.M. Leroy, P.
Rollin, unpub. data). Furthermore, we observed little scav-
enging of carcasses during the first days after the animal’s
death.
Serum from a survivor of the human outbreak in
Mekambo (Grand Etoumbi, March 2002), who had direct
contact with a gorilla carcass, was positive for Ebola
virus–specific IgG. Ebola virus L gene sequences were
detected in bone marrow samples of this gorilla, conclu-
sively linking the 2 cases. Thus, the last outbreaks in
Mekambo (Gabon, 2001) and Lossi (Republic of Congo,
2002–2003) confirm that wild animal mortality can reveal
Ebola virus propagation in the forest ecosystem and indi-
cate a role of wild animals as “vectors” in human out-
breaks.
No effective medical treatment or vaccine exists for
Ebola virus infection. The only way of minimizing human
cases is to break the chain of human-human transmission.
Humans do not seem to be at a major risk for infection by
the unidentified natural host(s). Large outbreaks among
wild animals can amplify human outbreaks by increasing
the number of index transmission events. Therefore, reduc-
ing contacts between humans and dead wildlife can reduce
the risks for transmission.
Epidemiologic surveillance of animal mortality rates
can thus help prevent the emergence of the disease in
human populations (Figure 6). At the time of the Kéllé
(Republic of Congo) outbreak, our network detected
infected gorilla carcasses (Lossi, December 6, 2002) 3
weeks before the disease emerged in humans (December
25, 2002), showing active Ebola virus propagation in this
area. We were thus able to warn health authorities of an
imminent human outbreak in the region. Nonetheless, a
human outbreak occurred. In June 2003, we issued a new
alert on a risk for human outbreaks after the discovery of
an infected gorilla carcass near the village of Mbanza
(Republic of Congo). An outbreak occurred in this village
in November 2003. These failures suggest that human and
animal health authorities need to work together more
closely. In the future, health authorities need to educate
local populations on the risk for infection through contact
with carcasses at all times. During expected disease out-
breaks, health authorities need to be able to respond imme-
diately by sending teams to affected areas (24). The early
successes of the network in this area warrant its extension
to all countries with known outbreaks of hemorrhagic
fevers. The participation of new frontline partners, such as
foresters, would be invaluable to expend logistical existing
capacity provided largely by field conservationists.
Finally, as the capacity of such a system to react rapidly is
crucial for its success, sampling teams should be created to
collect material and obtain virologic testing results with a
minimum of delay in other countries harboring hemor-
rhagic viruses. An efficient animal mortality monitoring
network backed up by a rapid reaction system would allow
public health authorities to predict and possibly prevent
human Ebola outbreaks.
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Figure 6. Schematic representation of the Ebola cycle in the equa-
torial forest and proposed strategy to avoid Ebola virus transmis-
sion to humans and its subsequent human-human propagation.
Ebola virus replication in the natural host (a). Wild animal infection
by the natural host(s) (b), no doubt the main source of infection.
Wild animal infection by contact with live or dead wild animals (c).
This scenario would play a marginal role. Infection of hunters by
manipulation of infected wild animal carcasses or sick animals (d).
Three animal species are known to be sensitive to Ebola virus and
to act as sources of human outbreaks, gorillas, chimpanzees, and
duikers. Person-to-person transmission from hunters to their fam-
ily and then to hospital workers (e). The wild animal mortality sur-
veillance network can predict and might prevent human outbreaks.
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